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Legible pluralism: The politics of ethnic and religious identification 
in Malaysia 
Graham K. Brown 
Abstract 
This paper examines the changing nature of ethnic and religious identification in Malaysia, 
drawing upon a survey of attitudes conducted in three locations in Malaysia.  The paper argues 
that the widely perceived political shift from a prevailing ethnic Malay/non-Malay dichotomy 
towards a more religious Muslim/non-Muslim dichotomy is more complex that previous 
analyses have suggested.  Moreover, the paper argues that while this shift has typically been 
seen as primarily societally driven, a more complete explanation of these changes needs to 
account for the changing role of the state in identity construction and boundary-making.  To this 
end, the paper appropriates Scott’s notion of ‘legibility’ and argues that the changing politics of 
ethnicity and religion in Malaysia must be located within the bureaucratic politics of identity and 
the increasing ‘legibility’ of religion vis-à-vis ethnicity for a state concerned to differentiate and 
stratify its citizenry. 
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1 Introduction 
In April 2001, a High Court judge in Malaysia rejected a petition by Lina Joy, a Muslim-born 
Malay woman who had converted to Christianity, to have the word ‘Islam’ removed from her 
identity card.  Apostasy, or conversion away from Islam, is highly sinful in most interpretations of 
Islam and in some schools of Islamic jurisprudence is considered punishable by death (Mohamed 
Azam Mohamed Adil 2007).  The judge rejected her application by rejecting her conversion, 
stating that ‘[t]he appellant being originally a Malay, by reason of the definition of "Malay" in 
Clause (2) of Article 160 of the Federal Constitution, with its requirement of professing the 
religion of Islam, the appellant will remain a Malay to her dying day and cannot renounce 
Islam’.
1
   Lina Joy appealed against this decision, first to the Court of Appeal and subsequently to 
the Federal Court, Malaysia’s highest court, both of which rejected her appeal.  These rulings 
against Lina Joy did not go as far as the High Court in rejecting her conversion per se, however, 
but rather rejected the appeal on the constitutional grounds that matters pertaining to Islam are 
in the sole purview of the country’s parallel Shari’a Court system, over which the Federal Court 
or any other secular court has no jurisdiction.   
The appeal rulings against Lina Joy, together with similar rulings in other cases, created – or at 
any rate highlighted – something of a constitutional quagmire in Malaysia over the position and 
jurisdiction of the Shari’a Courts within the broader legal system.  My initial concern here, 
however, is not with this crisis per se but with the nature and ramifications of the various courts’ 
reasoning.  The High Court’s judgment in dismissing her petition was based not on religious 
reasoning or Islamic jurisprudence, but rather on an explicitly ethnic logic; it was her status as a 
‘Malay’ that prevented Lina Joy from converting to Christianity, rather than her status as a 
Muslim.  The Malaysian constitution includes a number of provisions for ‘Special Rights’ for 
Malays and other indigenous groups, initially largely derived from British colonial policies but 
radically extended following the implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) affirmative 
action programme in 1971, which, among other provisions, stipulated ethnic quotas in all higher 
education institutions, ethnic employment quotas for companies seeking government contracts, 
and ethnic share distribution quotas for companies newly listing on the stock market.  In this 
context, an explicit definition of what legally constitutes a ‘Malay’ – comprised by Article 160(2), 
to which the judge referred, which defines a ‘Malay’ as a Malaysian citizen ‘who professes the 
religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language [and] conforms to Malay custom [adat]’ – 
was clearly of bureaucratic advantage in terms of identifying which individuals were entitled to 
the benefits of these ‘Special Rights’.  In this case, however, the judge’s interpretation effectively 
reversed the thrust of the clause – instead of interpreting the clause as bestowing entitlements 
upon a specific group of individuals, he interpreted it as enforcing religious obligations upon her 
because of her ethno-racial descent.  In contrast, in rulings in both the Appeal Court and the 
Federal Court dismissed the relevance of these arguments but nonetheless upheld the High 
Court’s rejection of her application on the grounds that the matter, dealing as it did with Islamic 
affairs, should have been brought to the Shari’a Court, over which the secular courts have no 
jurisdiction.  The higher courts’ reasoning was hence based entirely upon matter of religion and 
                                                           
1
 Reported in the Judgment of Abdul Aziz Mohamad JCA, Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah 
Persekutuan & 2 Others, Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia [Appeals Court of Malaysia], 19 September 2005. 
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legal jurisdiction, without addressing the question of the appellant’s ethnic background and the 
associated entitlements or obligations. 
I have chosen to begin by highlighting this case because it presents something of a microcosm of 
the central argument that I make in this paper.  As will be explored further below, many analysts 
see a declining influence of ethnic identification in Malaysia, particularly among urban Malays, 
and a concomitant increasing import for religious identification.  The state’s response to these 
changing sociological dynamics of identification have, until relatively recently, been largely 
‘defensive’, seeking to appropriate the renewed legitimacy afforded by state-sponsored 
religiosity without undermining the essentially secular nature of the elite political consensus that 
has abided, more or less intact, since independence (see, e.g., Case 1996).  More recently, 
however, a more stridently pro-Islam line has entered mainstream politics; instead of the just 
‘form’, Islam has an increasing role in the ‘content’ of national politics and policy-making.  In 
seeking to understand this ‘desecularizing’ shift towards a more prominent role for religion in 
state discourse and practice, this paper examines the relationship between religious and ethnic 
identity in Malaysia, particularly among the politically dominant Malay community; and asks 
how, and why, does the state seek to privilege particular forms of identity distinction over and 
above other forms?  I argue that it must be understood both within the context of the bottom-
up shift in identity contours of Malaysian, and particularly Malay, society – the declining import 
of ethnicity vis-à-vis religion – but also as a consequence of the increasing top-down ‘legibility’ of 
religion as a means of differentiating, and ‘disciplining’ the population and exerting social 
control. 
This paper proceeds as follows.  The next section reviews the political and anthropological 
literature on the role of ethnicity and identity in Malaysian society, paying particular attention to 
recent works that identify a fundamental shift in societal divisions from an ethnic Malay/non-
Malay dichotomy to a largely coincident but qualitative different religious dichotomy of 
Muslim/non-Muslim.  Section 3 examines the ‘bottom-up’ dimension of this identity shift 
through the results of a survey of attitudes towards identity undertaken in two Malaysian states, 
which both complements and complicates the existing, largely ethnographic literature.  Section 
4 turns attention to the top-down dimension of identity shift, exploring the changing ways in 
which the Malaysian state has sought to privilege and protect certain identities over others.   
Section 5 concludes by reflecting on these findings within the broader context of theoretical 
debates about ethnicity and identity. 
2 ‘Race’, ethnicity, and religious identity in Malaysia 
Malaysia has long been a popular site for the scholarly investigation of the politics and sociology 
of multiethnic societies, featuring prominently in the work of such classic comparativists as 
Arend Lijphart (1977) and Donald Horowitz (1985; 1989).  As Horowitz notes (1989), at the time 
of independence, most observers expressed a pessimistic prognosis for Malaysia (then Malaya), 
largely due to perceived insurmountable problems in the management of the country’s diversity.  
In 1957, Malaya’s population was precariously balanced between indigenous Muslim Malays, 
who formed less than half the population, and immigrant groups, primarily Chinese and Indians.  
Moreover, decades of either benign neglect or, by some accounts, active marginalization of the 
Malay community by the British colonial powers had left the Malays socio-economically 
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disadvantaged in what they perceived to be their land (tanah Melayu).  The expansion of 
Malaysia to include two British territories on Borneo
2
 went some way towards solidifying the 
demographic dominance of the indigenous ‘bumiputera’ groups – an umbrella terms for the 
peninsular Malays and the East Malaysian indigenous groups – but with the Chinese also 
economically dominant in the Borneo states, the socio-economic problem remained.  Moreover, 
while the Malay elites at the time of the merger expressed confidence that the East Malaysian 
indigenous groups would largely assimilate into the broader Malay identity, or at least act in 
tandem with them, this has largely failed to emerge.  Historically, East Malaysian bumiputera 
have been subject to various state sponsored assimilation programmes aimed at bringing them 
within a broader ambit of ‘Malay’ identity, including Islamization.  Yet while Islamization 
programmes, usually with distinctly developmentalist inducements, have been relatively 
successful, ethnic identification in East Malaysia has remained remarkably impervious to this 
kind of modernist, homogenizing ‘racialization’ programmes, and indeed has occasionally 
sparked regionalist backlashes (Lim 2008). 
Malaysia has largely confounded these dire predictions, however.  With a developmental record 
near unmatched in the post-Second World War era – only Botswana and Singapore have 
outgrown Malaysia over the period as a whole – Malaysia is now often held up as a country that 
has successfully combined prudent ethnic balancing in the political realm with a relatively 
effective programme of ethnic restructuring, particularly since the inception of the redistributive 
New Economic Policy following ethnic rioting in 1969 (e.g. Snodgrass 1995).  Certainly, 
Malaysia’s democratic record does not live up to many liberal expectations – Malaysia has been 
governed by the Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front) coalition of ethnically-based political 
parties since independence
3
 and, while the basic political structures of democracy remain largely 
in place, these have largely been undermined by electoral machinations and gerrymandering, 
selective repression of political opponents and a virtually unchallenged control over the mass 
media (Brown 2005a; Brown 2005b; Lim 2003; Zaharom Nain 2002).  But for many political 
theorists, and, indeed, many Malaysians (Welsh 1996), not only is this a reasonable price to pay 
for stability and development, but moreover the assumptions of majoritarian rule instilled within 
the liberal conception of democracy are seen as entirely inappropriate in multiethnic contexts 
such as Malaysia (Lijphart 1986).   
In much social theory and research, the term ‘race’ has long been abandoned in favour of 
‘ethnicity’.  Particularly for scholars of the developing world, ‘racial’ categories are now largely 
seen as colonial constructs which combined bureaucratic and political purposes with a racist 
ideology that correlated a variety of social and individual attributes – intelligence, 
industriousness, aggressiveness – with biological descent, marked by physiological differences 
                                                           
2
 The Federation of Malaysia was formed in 1963 through the merger of Malaya, independent since 1957, 
with Singapore, which had been internally self-governing since 1959, and the British territories on Borneo: 
North Borneo (now Sabah) and Sarawak.  The historical consensus is that the merger was driven by British 
concerns over the increasingly Communist leanings of Singapore and a belief that incorporation into 
Malaya was the best way to dilute these influences.  The Malay elites in Malaya, however, were unwilling 
to countenance accepting Chinese-dominated Singapore without a demographic ‘counterweight’ of 
indigenous groups, which the Borneo territories provided.  The rapid and acrimonious departure of 
Singapore from the federation two years later solidified the demographic dominance of the bumiputera 
(Tilman 1963).   
3
 Prior to 1971, the BN was known as the Alliance and was composed of fewer parties. 
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(Lentz 2006; Ratcliffe 1994; Ukiwo 2005).  Colonial Malaya is no exception and has provided rich 
historical evidence of such processes of colonial ‘racialisation’.  Charles Hirschman, for instance, 
argues that prior to the arrival of European colonial powers in the region, Malaya was home to a 
range of ethnic stereotypes and prejudice, but that this was accompanied by ‘patterns of 
acculturation, shifting ethnic coalitions, and the possibility of ethnic boundaries being bridged’ 
(Hirschman 1986: p.332).  Indeed, any form of systematic ethnic identification appears to be a 
relative recent historical phenomenon in the Malay Peninsula. Matheson’s (1979) careful 
reading of the Malay hikayat (historical sagas) suggests that the term Melayu (Malay) itself has 
its origins in a vertical designation of aristocratic lineage, rather than any horizontal form of 
‘imagined community’.  In 1931, the British superintendant of the census in Malaya was 
complaining that ‘most Oriental peoples have themselves no clear conception of race, and 
commonly regard religion as the most important, if not determinant, element.  The Malay, for 
instance, regards adherence to Islam in much the same light as a European regards a racial 
distinction’ (C.A. Vlieland, quoted in Hirschman 1987: p.565). 
It was with the arrival of Europeans and their more biological and deterministic discourses of 
‘race’ that the salience of ethnoracial identification increased and ethnic fluidity restrained.  
Changing census classifications reflect and, in some interpretations, concretized this discourse.  
In the earliest censuses of the late nineteenth century Straits Settlements, migrant groups from 
within the broader ‘Malay world’ such as ‘Javanese’ and ‘Boyanese’ (Buginese) stood as census 
categories alongside ‘Malay’ and, for that matter, ‘Arab’, ‘Tamil’, ‘Singhalese’ and so forth.  
Later, such migrant groups from within the region had been reduced to sub-categories of, first, 
in 1901, ‘Malays and other Natives’; then, in 1911, to ‘Malays and Allied Races’, and finally, in 
1921, becoming subsumed with the ‘Malay Population’ (Hirschman 1987).  By the time of 
independence, it is argued, this racialisation of Malaya was deeply ingrained such that for many, 
if not most, Malaysians ‘race’ is taken for granted both as a concrete social category and the 
defining feature of political organization (Mandal 2004).   
Modern anthropological perspectives on identity have, of course, long challenged ‘primordial’, 
racially-based concepts of ethnicity, both in Malaysia and elsewhere.  In a seminal 
anthropological essay on the ‘situational selection of identity’, Nagata (1974) showed how many 
people who typically identified themselves as ‘Malay’ would, under certain circumstances, 
identify themselves as ‘Arab’ or ‘Javanese’ and actively differentiate themselves from ‘Malays’, 
abjuring the latter’s laziness, or other perceived stereotypical characteristics.  Similarly, Sharon 
Carstens has shown how ethnic ‘Chinese’ in Malaysia negotiate a ‘labyrinth’ of identities, 
encompassing ‘clan’ identities – Hakka, Hokkien, Cantonese and so forth – alongside the broader 
categories of ‘Chinese’, ‘Malaysian Chinese’ and ‘Malaysian’ (Carstens 2005). 
Since the 1980s, scholars of Malaysia have become interested in the increasingly important role 
that religion plays in Malaysian society, particularly the Islamic resurgence that began in the 
1970s, to the extent that since the turn of the century, many scholars are arguing that the over-
riding political salience of the old ethnic dichotomy of Malay/non-Malay is being supplanted by a 
religious dichotomy of Muslim/non-Muslim (Hussin Mutalib 1991; Korff 2001; Sharifah Zaleha 
Syed Hassan 2001).  While Islam has long been an integral aspect of Malay identity, it has taken 
an increasingly prominent role, both within the Malay community and in Malaysian politics more 
broadly.  For most scholars, this Islamic resurgence has emerged very much ‘from below’ and 
any institutionalization it has received in the political realm, such as the promotion of Islamic 
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banking and the formation of an Islamic University, has largely been seen as the begrudging and 
‘largely symbolic’ (Jomo and Ahmad Shabery Cheek 1992: p.92) concessions of a predominantly 
secular political elite, aimed at harnessing but not encouraging this resurgence.  Explanations for 
this bottom-up process have typically been implicitly or explicitly formulated within the broad 
framework what one could term neo-modernization theory (cf. Inglehart and Welzel 2005), 
which locates processes of cultural change in the context of the changing social context of 
economic development, albeit in a non-linear fashion.  In this context, the rapid urbanization of 
the Malay population associated with the New Economic Policy has been interpreted as 
something of a ‘push factor’ in identity change, as Malay identity, rooted in rural notions of the 
‘origin point’ (Peletz 1996), loses its social purchase in the modern, urban environment (Bunnell 
2002a; Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hassan 2001).  In contrast, broader social and economic forces of 
globalization are interpreted as more of a ‘pull factor’ for Islamic identification, providing a route 
for linking local identities with a broader, internationalist identity, albeit one at odds in some 
ways from the dominant Western liberal ideology (Bunnell 2002b; Korff 2001). 
Yet particularly since the retirement of long-time prime minister Mahathir Mohamad (1981-
2003), the new administration under Abdullah Ahmad Badawi has become increasingly 
concerned with placing a particular interpretation of Islamic governance – dubbed Islam Hadhari 
(Civilizational Islam) – at the centre of the government’s political strategy.   Such literature that 
exists on Islam Hadhari sees it as little more than a rhetorical reworking of the decades-old 
ideological contest over the ‘proper’ interpretation of Islam between the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO), the senior partner in the Barisan Nasional coalition, and the Partai Islam 
seMalaysia (PAS, Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party), one of the main opposition parties (Chong 2006).  
While its rhetorical content is indeed little different from previous manifestations of UMNO 
ideology, however, its emergence has been coincident with increasing role for Islam in the 
practice of governance; moreover, even in rhetorical ways, religion in the form of Islam Hadhari 
is increasingly encroaching on areas previously relatively secularized, such as development 
policy.  A discussion and an explanation of this trend will be offered in section 4.  First, however, 
we turn to ‘bottom-up’ question of the trajectory of religious and ethnic identification. 
3 Ethnic and religious identification: Survey evidence 
In this section, I draw upon evidence from a survey of attitudes towards ethnicity and religion 
conducted in two state capitals in Malaysia and their rural peripheries in 2006:  Georgetown and 
the rural areas of Penang Island in the state of Penang; Kuantan district in Pahang, comprising 
both the state capital of Kuantan and its rural periphery.
4
   The survey was also conducted in the 
West Coast division of Sabah state, including the state capital of Kota Kinabalu, although I do not 
discuss these results extensively here.  The survey interviewed 300 randomly selected 
individuals in each site, with an addition 50 urban Malays sampled at a later date due to their 
small population size.  All results are weighted by ethnicity, urban-rural status and region. The 
aim of this section is to examine how far these data complement or complicate the largely 
ethnographic accounts of Malaysian identity shift outlined above.   
                                                           
4
 For keen Malaysianists, it is important to note that the survey was conducted prior to the escalation of 
ethnic and religious tensions associated with the Hindraf movement and the “Article 11” debate. 
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Before examining the West Malaysian in more detail below, however, I want to begin this 
section by asking how far the historic ‘racialisation’ of Malaysian society identified above has 
really impacted upon people’s perceptions of themselves and others.  The simplest way to do so 
is to examine how people identify themselves when given an open-ended question about their 
ethnicity.  In the two sites surveyed in West Malaysia, only a handful of respondents provided a 
self-description other than the ‘big three’ identities of Malay, Chinese and Indian: one ‘Chinese’ 
respondent described themselves by their regional/clan ancestry of Ruijiu; six ‘Indian’ 
respondents selected to describe themselves as Tamil, and one as ‘Sikh’.  Although the question 
was asked in a completely open-ended way, it might be suggested that something in the 
construction of the interview or the question led people towards the ‘easy’ answers, but we can 
disavow this possibility by comparing these results with the responses given in the East 
Malaysian state of Sabah, where over forty different ethnic labels were provided by 
respondents, including even extremely localized identities such as ‘Dusun Lotud’, a sub-category 
of ‘Dusun’, itself a sub-category of the (largely political) identity of Kadazandusun, or by 
concatenated identities reflecting diverse parentage, including three-part self-descriptions such 
as ‘Bajau Suluk Dusun’.  This, it should be noted, is despite a concerted political campaign to 
promote ‘Kadazandusun’ as an umbrella identity for many of Sabah’s indigenous groups (Reid 
1997; Roff 1969).  In comparison, none of the peninsular ‘Malays’ interviewed identified 
themselves as Melayu Minangkabau, Javanese Malay, Arab Malay or indeed offered any such 
qualifier.  It might again be argued that the indigenous groups of Sabah are characterised by far 
greater linguistic and religious diversity than the ‘Malay’ population of West Malaysia, and there 
is certainly a point to be made here.  But an even more direct comparison between the West 
Malaysia strata and Sabah can be made in terms of the population of Chinese origin.  Table 1 
shows how respondents in the three regional strata who could be post facto coded as ‘Chinese’ 
reported their own ethnic identity in response to the open-ended question.  In Kuantan and 
Penang combined, only one respondent chose not to describe themselves as Chinese (or Cina) – 
a result particularly remarkable in urban Penang, given that it is widely seen as a Chinese-
dominated town and, hence, one might expect intra-Chinese identity differentials to become 
important.  In contrast, in Sabah only around 12.8% of the ‘Chinese’ population reported 
themselves as such, with the remainder giving their ‘clan’ or linguistic affiliation. 
Table 1: Self-description of ‘Chinese’ survey respondents by survey stratum 
 Kuantan Penang Sabah 
'Chinese' 99.2% 100.0% 12.8% 
Cantonese 0.0% 0.0% 5.1% 
Foochew 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 
Hainan 0.0% 0.0% 5.1% 
Hakka 0.0% 0.0% 46.2% 
Hokkien 0.0% 0.0% 17.9% 
Ruijiu 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Teochew 0.0% 0.0% 5.1% 
 
Of course, ‘identity’ is a multiple and layered phenomenon and it might be the case that the 
nuances picked up in the ‘ethnic’ self-description by Sabahan Chinese but virtually absent from 
West Malaysian Chinese self-description are nonetheless important to the latter’s sense of 
identity, but simply not perceived of as part of their ‘ethnic’ identity.  As is explored further 
below, this does indeed appear to be the case with respect to the importance attributed to 
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language, which is one of the main markers of difference between Chinese clans.  But this does 
not obviate from the point here, which is that in contrast to Sabahan Chinese, West Malaysian 
Chinese viewed their ethnic identities more-or-less uniformly in terms of the macro ‘racial’ 
category of ‘Chinese/Cina’.  While multiple and over-lapping constituents of ethnic identity may 
well remain important to people, as the anthropological literature suggests, this finding confirms 
that in West Malaysia (in contrast to Sabah), the most immediately salient dimension of 
ethnicity – the first thing people turn to, so to speak – has indeed become almost uniformly 
trichotomized into the three ‘races’ of Malay, Chinese, and Indian. 
Table 2:  Importance of identity aspects by ethnic group 
  
  
Percent Rank 95% C.I. 
Significance of diff. 
from Malay (t-stat) 
R
e
li
g
io
n
 
Malay 93.3% 1 89.6% 96.9%     
Chinese 41.1% 4 34.4% 47.9% -13.29 *** 
Indian 71.1% 1 59.7% 82.6% -3.61 *** 
All Groups 67.6% 1 63.4% 71.9%     
N
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
 
Malay 68.1% 2 61.7% 74.6%    
Chinese 38.9% 5 32.1% 45.7% -6.10 *** 
Indian 38.1% 4 26.6% 49.6% -4.41 *** 
All Groups 52.4% 2 48.0% 56.8%    
E
th
n
ic
it
y 
Malay 37.8% 3 31.7% 43.8%     
Chinese 50.2% 1 43.2% 57.2% 2.62 *** 
Indian 43.7% 3 31.9% 55.6% 0.86   
All Groups 43.9% 3 39.5% 48.3%     
La
n
g
u
a
g
e
 Malay 29.4% 4 23.1% 35.8%    
Chinese 47.5% 2 40.5% 54.5% 3.77 *** 
Indian 28.5% 5 17.2% 39.8% -0.14   
All Groups 37.7% 4 33.2% 42.1%    
O
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
 
Malay 22.8% 6 16.9% 28.8%     
Chinese 41.8% 3 34.9% 48.7% 4.06 *** 
Indian 52.8% 2 40.7% 64.8% 4.35 *** 
All Groups 33.9% 5 29.5% 38.2%     
G
e
n
d
e
r 
Malay 28.9% 5 22.6% 35.3%    
Chinese 22.5% 6 16.5% 28.5% -1.44   
Indian 10.2% 8 2.6% 17.7% -3.73 *** 
All Groups 24.5% 6 20.4% 28.6%    
P
la
ce
 o
f 
R
e
si
d
e
n
ce
 Malay 4.6% 8 2.0% 7.3%     
Chinese 15.1% 7 10.1% 20.0% 3.65 *** 
Indian 13.0% 6 4.4% 21.6% 1.83   
All Groups 10.1% 7 7.4% 12.8%     
P
la
ce
 o
f 
B
ir
th
 
Malay 3.8% 9 0.8% 6.7%    
Chinese 9.0% 8 4.8% 13.3% 2.00 * 
Indian 12.3% 7 3.8% 20.8% 1.86   
All Groups 6.9% 8 4.4% 9.3%    
P
o
lit
ic
a
l 
id
e
o
lo
g
y 
Malay 4.8% 7 1.5% 8.0%     
Chinese 2.6% 9 0.3% 4.9% -1.05   
Indian 5.3% 9 -0.5% 11.1% 0.15   
All Groups 3.8% 9 1.9% 5.7%     
Note: Significance of t-stat designated by asterisks: * <5%; ** <2.5%; *** <1%. 
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In order to assess the varying importance of different aspects to an overall sense of (group) 
identity, survey respondents were presented with a list of nine possible identity ‘aspects’ and 
asked to rank the three aspects most important to their sense of their own identity.
5
  
Respondents were also allowed to nominate identity aspects not on the list, although only very 
few did.  Table 2 summarizes the results of this table for the three ethnic groups.  The first 
column shows the raw percentage of respondents who reported each identity factor among 
their top three, along with the implied rank that each identity factor obtains for the relevant 
group in the second column.  The third and fourth column report the 95% confidence interval for 
the population from which the survey was sampled.  For the Chinese and Indian groups, the final 
column reports the statistical significance of the difference between their reported levels of 
attachment to the relevant identity factor and that reported by the Malay respondents.  These 
results are, of course, somewhat crude and may obscure considerable variation both within and 
between groups in relation to such other factors as age, gender, education, and so forth.  But 
even at this level of aggregation, interesting results differences emerge.  Indeed, the extent to 
which the groups vary in the importance they attach to different identity aspects is marked; in 
all but the overall least-popular aspect of ‘political ideology’, at least one of the non-Malay 
groups reported a level of importance with a statistically significant difference from the Malay 
population.  The difference between the importance attached to religion, language, and gender 
by Chinese and Indians was also statistically significant.
6
  
Clearly, the strongest single association between a given ethnic group and a given identity aspect 
is between Malays and religion; even at the lowest estimate of the confidence interval, 9 in 10 
Malays would still report religion as one of their three most important identity aspect.  
Moreover, 77% of Malays who reported religion as important, or 72% of all Malays, ranked 
religion as their most important identity aspect.  No other correlation between an ethnic group 
and a particular identity aspect was anywhere near as strong; the next closest was the 
identification of Indian respondents with, again, religion.  But even this pales in comparison; 72% 
of Indians reported religion among their top three identity aspects but only 28% reported it as 
their most important aspect; moreover, because Indians are such as small proportion of the 
population, the number of Indians respondents surveyed was relatively small, meaning that the 
confidence interval for Indians is very wide (as with other results for this group throughout the 
survey). 
The next result to note is the relatively low importance that Malay respondents attached to 
ethnicity and language, which for the group as a whole ranked third and fourth respectively, 
with positive responses well below both religion and the second ranked aspect of ‘nationality’.  
Even taking the upper bound of the confidence interval, less than half the Malay population 
consider ethnicity among their top three identity aspects; even fewer for language.  Moreover, 
there were no Malay respondents at all who ranked ethnicity as their most important identity 
aspect and only 5.7% (confidence interval: 3.0%-10.5%) who ranked language as their most 
important aspect.  This is in marked contrast to the Chinese population, which as a group ranked 
ethnicity as its most important aspect; around 1 in 5 (18.2%, C.I. 13.7%-23.7%) Chinese 
respondents ranked it as the most important of the three identity aspects they nominated.   
                                                           
5
 The nine aspects were: gender, language, ethnicity, religion, nationality, place of birth, place of 
residence, employment/occupation, political ideology.   
6
 Results not reported in table for space considerations. 
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At this point it is worth returning to the issue of identity overlap.  Because particular identities, 
especially ‘ethnic’ identity, often overlap with other dimensions, it is plausible that some of 
these results may be explained in that in nominating one identity aspect, respondent took it for 
granted, so to speak, that this included or implied the importance of other aspects.  Indeed, as 
already noted, Malay identity is constitutionally linked to religion and language, which is likely 
both to reflect and to have a heavy impact of its own on the way Malays actually perceive their 
‘ethnic’ identity.  The ‘overlap’ between religion and ethnicity for Malays does not explain why 
ethnicity ranks lowly when compared with religion although if the results had been the other 
way round we might have been able to explain a low showing for religion in terms of the 
importance attached to ethnicity, as religion is if anything constitutive of ethnic Malay identity 
rather than vice versa.  But it may help explain the relatively low showing for both ethnicity and 
language if these labels were taken by respondents as ‘substitutes’, to speak economically, 
expressing essentially the same thing, albeit with nuances that a survey such as this could not 
pick up.  Conversely, for the Chinese, ‘ethnic’ Chinese identity – which we may reasonably take 
‘ethnicity’ to represent in this case given the uniform answer given to the open-ended question 
discussed above – is more likely to be taken as something qualitatively much more distinct from 
‘language’, which respondents may have linked to their ‘clan’ group.  
Table 3: Proportion of Malays and Chinese reporting language and ethnicity among their most important identity 
aspects (percent of group) 
  
MALAY CHINESE 
Language Language 
No Yes Total No Yes Total 
E
th
n
ic
it
y
 
N
o
 
34.1 28.1 62.2 21.9 27.9 49.8 
[28.0-40.7] 
 
[22.3-34.8] 
 
[56.7-67.5] 
 
[16.6-28.4] 
 
[22.1-34.6] 
 
[42.9-56.8] 
 
Y
e
s 
36.5 1.3 37.8 30.6 19.6 50.2 
[31.3-42.0] 
 
[0.4-4.3] 
 
[32.5-43.3] 
 
[24.5-37.4] 
 
[14.7-25.7] 
 
[43.2-57.1] 
 
T
o
ta
l 70.6 29.4 100.0 52.5 47.5 100.0 
[63.9-76.5] [23.5-36.1] -              [45.5-59.4] [40.6-54.5] -            
Note: Figure in square brackets gives 95% confidence interval 
To examine these possibilities, Table 3 cross-tabulates the responses for language and ethnicity 
for the Malay and Chinese respondents.  Within the Malay responses, there is clear evidence of 
a ‘substitution effect’ between ethnicity and language – while over 60% picked at least one of 
the two, less than 2% of respondents selected both.  This has important effects on the results of 
Table 2 because if we recode ‘ethnicity’ and ‘language’ into one variable of ‘ethnicity/language’ 
for the Malay population, this produces a much higher results of 65.9% (C.I. 59.3-72.5), although 
this combined result still does not quite dislodge ‘nationality’ as the second-ranking identity 
aspect for Malays as a group.  The situation is much less clear for the Chinese, where around 1 in 
5 respondents reported both language and ethnicity, suggesting that these elements are indeed 
seen as something distinct and separate, at least by some sections of the Chinese community.  It 
is worth noting here that the design of the question means that, at a very practical and systemic 
level, all the options were substitutes as respondents could only select three options and, hence, 
the selection of one option automatically reduces the likelihood that another option is chosen.  
Given this systemic bias towards substitution within the question design, it is all the more 
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convincing evidence of the non-substitutability of language and ethnicity for Chinese, given that 
the Chinese rate of selection for both options was so high.
7
   Confirming evidence that ‘language’ 
for the Chinese respondents is more associated with ‘clan’ identity can be confirmed by 
examining responses to a question on the main language spoken at home.  We saw above that 
virtually all Chinese respondents gave ‘Chinese’ in response to an open-ended question on 
ethnic identity; in contrast when asked an equally open-ended question about the main 
language they spoke at home, 84.2% of Chinese respondents named a particular Chinese 
language or dialect, with only 8.0% responding ‘Chinese’; the remainder spoke English at home.  
We will return to this question later when we consider intra-group differences in attitudes 
towards identity. 
At this stage, it is also worth noting the level of support for ‘nationality’ as an identity aspect.  
First, it should be noted that the proportion of the overall survey population that listed 
nationality among their top three identity aspects was surprisingly high compared with similar 
surveys in different countries.  In Ghana and Nigeria, less than 40% of respondents selected 
nationality (Jomo and Ahmad 1992: p.97), while in Central Sulawesi province of neighbouring 
Indonesia, less than 15% of respondents chose nationality.  Given the heavy nationalistic 
emphasis on ‘patriotism’ in the political discourse of the BN regime – from the first year it is 
taught in primary school, the stated objective of the history curriculum is the inculcation of 
‘patriotism’ (1983) – this is perhaps unsurprising.  But after religion, ‘nationality’ is also the 
identity aspect in which there is the largest difference between Malay and non-Malay 
(particularly Chinese) response rates.As discussed above, a considerable ethnographic literature 
has built up in Malaysia identifying significant identity distinctions between urban and rural 
contexts, particularly for the Malay population.  Urban Malays, mostly relatively recent migrants, 
are seen as experiencing a radical identity reformulation as the old kampung (village) social 
context and hierarchies lose their relevance in a new urban setting.  These scholars have 
identified a consequential resurgence of urban Malay identification with Islam and Islamic ways 
of life as filling the gap, so to speak, left by the decline of kampung attachments.   
                                                           
7
 If all three options were chosen at random from the nine available (excluding for the moment the self-
nominated option), then there would be a 37.9% chance of a given aspect αx being selected 
(1/9+1/8+1/7).  If, on the other hand, a respondent actively selected one option αy but randomly picked 
the other two, then there would be only a 26.8% chance (1/8+1/7) of αx appearing in the final list.  In 
other words, suppose Chinese respondents who picked ‘ethnicity’ did so actively but distributed their 
other options randomly, there we would expect to see only 26.8% listing of them listing ‘language’ as well, 
and vice versa; the actual figures are 39.1% and 41.2% respectively.  Note that in some senses, then, we 
should be interpreting the results of this question in relation to a possible random distribution, i.e. testing 
how far group responses deviate from a random likelihood distributed around a mean of 37.9%.  We can 
defend the current interpretation against this by returning to the possibility within the question of self-
nominating an alternative identity aspect, which generates a potentially limitless list of options to choose 
from, and the possibility of selection ‘no-response’ (which was exercised by 2.8% of interviewees on this 
question), effectively removing the in-built substitution effect.  Nonetheless, we must accept that the 
question may at least have influenced respondents towards the pre-listed options, implying a degree of 
substitution effect. 
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Figure 1: Importance of identity aspects for Malay respondents, by urban status 
Note: Error bars report 95% confidence interval 
Comparing the survey data with these broad conclusions, however, produces some interesting 
point of tension and agreement.  Figure 1 shows the four most important identity aspects 
identified by Malays in Table 2 above, broken down by urban-rural status; it also includes the 
combined measure of ethnicity/language.  Firstly, there is no evident difference between the 
overall importance ranking for religion produced by urban and rural Malays; for both sub-
groups, it is by far the common important identity aspect and the slightly higher result for rural 
Malays in the figure is not statistically significant (t=1.38, P>|t|=0.169).  Moreover, if we break 
these groups down by the individual rankings given to religion, then the data suggest that if 
anything rural Malays have a stronger religious attachment than urban Malays (Table 4); around 
four-fifths of urban Malays ranked religion as their most important identity aspect, compared 
with less than half the urban Malay respondents, while almost three times as many urban 
Malays than rural Malays did not list religion at all.  Of course, these data only provide a 
snapshot view, but in response to a different retrospective question on whether the importance 
of religion in general was increasing, decreasing or unchanged  over time, 89.6% of rural Malays 
saw religion as becoming more important compared with 77.2% of urban Malays although again 
the difference is not statistically significant.  Nonetheless, the point here is that increasing 
religiosity among urban Malays may be qualitatively different from urban areas – as indeed will 
be argued below – but not quantitatively so. 
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Table 4: Importance of religion to Malay respondents’ sense of identity, by urban status 
% of respondents Rural Urban 
Not ranked 5.0% 11.6% 
 
[2.4-9.9] 
 
[6.1-20.8] 
 
Ranked third 2.9% 16.3% 
 
[1.1-7.5] 
 
[9.4-26.8] 
 
Ranked second 12.2% 26.5% 
 
[7.9-18.6] 
 
[17.9-37.3] 
 
Ranked first 79.9% 45.6% 
 
[73.1-85.4] 
 
[34.9-56.7] 
 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
 - - 
Note: 95% confidence intervals in square brackets 
If the level and trend in identification with religion is not significantly different between urban 
and rural Malays, there is certainly a considerable and statistically significant (t=5.26, 
P>|t|=0.000) difference between the importance attached to ‘ethnicity’ between the two 
groups.  Indeed, while ‘ethnicity’ remained the fourth most important identity aspect for rural 
Malays, it drops to eighth position for urban Malays, with only 11.6% ranking it among their top 
three identity aspects.  Interestingly, the single factor to rank lower for urban Malays was place 
of residence with only 1.4%, which may be interpreted as confirming a broad sense of 
dislocation among urban Malays.  Similarly, in response to a different question, the proportion 
of urban Malays who reported objections to interethnic marriages was significantly lower than 
for rural Malays, at 14.0% against 37.2%.  
While ‘ethnicity’ appears to be a less important issue for urban Malays than their rural 
counterparts, however, a significantly higher proportion of urban Malays than rural Malays 
ranked language among their three most important identity aspects (t= -2.18, P>|t|=0.030).  As 
we saw earlier, ‘language’ and ‘ethnicity’ were to some degree treated as substitutes by the 
Malay population and when we consider the combined ethnicity/language variable, fewer urban 
Malay respondents ranked it as important than rural Malays, but the difference is no longer 
strongly statistically significant (t=1.73, P>|t|=0.084).  But whereas among both sub-groups 
language and ethnicity appear to remain substitutes – with less than 3% of urban Malays 
selecting both aspects and less than 1% of their rural counterparts doing so – the selection 
between ‘ethnicity’ and ‘language’ is clearly skewed between the two groups, with over two-
thirds of urban Malays who selected one of the two preferring ‘language’ against more than 
three quarters of rural Malays preferring ‘ethnicity’. 
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Figure 2: Perceptions of changing importance of religion and ethnicity 
As already mentioned, the limitations of a survey such as this is that it only provides us with a 
static snapshot of perceptions of identity.  In an attempt to address this problem, the survey also 
asked two questions to gauge whether respondents felt that the importance of ethnicity and 
religion had increased, decreased, or remained about the same over recent years.  Figure 2 
reports the proportion of respondents reporting an increased importance for religion or 
ethnicity, broken down by ethnicity and urban-rural status.  In terms of ethnicity, answers were 
remarkably uniform.  Around sixty per cent of the population, whether Malay or non-Malay, 
urban or rural, felt that ethnicity had increased in importance over recent years.  The results for 
the importance of religion were more varied, however.  In urban areas, there was no statistically 
significant difference between the proportion of Malays and non-Malays reporting an increased 
importance for religion, and levels were rough parallel with the equivalent proportions reporting 
an increased importance for ethnicity.  In rural areas, however, there was a stark divided – 
around 9 in 10 Malays compared with around a quarter of non-Malays reported an increased 
importance of religion.  In terms of the intra-ethnic differences, it is important to note that while 
the majority of Malays in both urban and rural areas reported an increasing importance for 
religion, the proportion was significantly higher among rural Malays than their urban 
counterparts, complementing the results above suggesting that while religion is typically of great 
importance to all Malays, this is particularly strong in the rural areas.   The intra-ethnic 
differential among non-Malays was even starker, however, with a clear majority of urban non-
Malays reporting an increase in the importance of religion but only around a quarter of their 
rural counterparts doing likewise.  As will be explored further in the next section, a plausible 
explanation for this differential may be the extent to which the increasing moral policing 
associated with religion has played out primarily in urban areas.  Figure 2 does not report the 
proportion of respondents reporting a decrease in the importance of religion and ethnicity, as 
these figures were very low across the board, with one exception.  Less than ten percent of all 
groups reported a decreased importance of either religion or ethnicity, except for the urban 
Malays, around a quarter of whom (23.1%) reported a decrease in the importance of ethnicity. 
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To conclude this section, the survey evidence presented here provides clear confirming evidence 
that religion overwhelmingly trumps ethnicity as a source of identification for the Malay 
population both in urban and rural areas and that this is an increasing trend, but suggests that if 
anything religion is slightly more important among rural Malays than urban Malays.  It also 
somewhat complicates the existing story about declining ethnic identification among Malays.  
While the survey broadly confirms the ethnographic accounts of a relatively low importance for 
ethnicity among at least a section of the urban Malay, it suggests that an identification with 
language may be taking up some of the slack, so to speak, rather than a uniform turn to religion.  
Moreover, there is no evidence of a declining trend in ethnic identification.   
4 Making identity legible:  The bureaucratization of cultural entry 
and exit 
Thus far, then, we have seen that when we examine the perceptions and attitudes towards 
group identity in peninsular Malaysia, there are significant differences between the main ethnic 
groups, as one might expect, but also within ethnic groups, particularly between urban and rural 
areas.  In this section, I turn attention to the state-sponsored desecularization of Malaysia in 
recent years.  As already noted, Islam has played an increasingly important role in regime 
attempts to mould a ‘new Malay’ (Melayu baru).  In the 1980s, when the BN government under 
Mahathir began an Islamization drive that saw the establishment of Islamic banking and an 
Islamic university among other measures, many observers saw this as little more than ‘largely 
symbolic concessions’  aimed at harnessing the legitimacy of the resurgence of Islam within 
society while ‘taming’ (Weiss 2004) its political drive.  A prescient article by Mauzy and Milne 
(1983), however, saw something more than symbolic in Mahathir’s drive; Islam, they argued, 
was a means of ‘disciplining’ the Malays.  Over the ensuing two decades, particularly since 
Abdullah replaced Mahathir as prime minister, this phenomenon has become ever clearer.  Early 
in his premiership, Abdullah publicized his concept of Islam Hadhari, a ten-point programme that 
entwined Islamic injunctions with a social and economic developmentalism.  Concomitant with 
the promotion of Islam Hadhari, the Abdullah administration has seen religion take up a position 
in the developmental discourse of the government in a way it had not done previously.  While 
the Mahathir administration had pursued selected policies that emphasized Islamic 
development, these were very much parallel to a mostly secular development strategy. 
The Ninth Malaysia Plan, the first of the country’s five year development programmes to be 
designed and implemented by the Abdullah administration, reversed both of these trends.  
Firstly, it gave Abdullah’s conception of Islam Hadhari a central place in the government’s 
development vision, stating that all development initiatives would ‘be guided by the universal 
principles of Islam Hadhari’ as a ‘comprehensive and universal development framework for the 
nation’ (Malaysia 2006).  Secondly, the Plan returned the practice of setting specific targets for 
the reduction of ethnic inequalities across multiple dimensions, a practice that had largely been 
dropped by the Mahathir administration. 
Reading the parliamentary debates following the tabling of the Plan in April 2006, however, it is 
marked how far opposition disquiet over the Plan revolved around the promotion of Islam 
 Legible pluralism: The politics of ethnic and religious identification in Malaysia 
Brown 
15 | P a g e  
Hadhari as the central developmental tenet rather than the restoration of a more vigorous 
ethnic restructuring thrust.  The leader of the opposition, veteran MP Lim Kit Siang, expressed 
these concerns thus:  
When Islam Hadhari is raised in rank and status to become the directive principal 
for all Malaysians, irrespective of religion, and not limited only to the Islamic 
population, an important principle of democratic governance is questioned. 
(Hansard, Dewan Rakyat, 03.04.2006, my translation) 
As noted in the previous sections, for the large part ethnic identity in West Malaysia has indeed 
largely congealed into the three ‘racial’ groups of Malay, Chinese and Indian.  The Malaysian 
state has long been concerned with the fuzzy edges of this formula, however.  As already noted, 
ethnic identity in the eastern Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak is considerably more 
fragmented than in the peninsula.   
My argument in this section, then, is that the BN regime in Malaysia has of late given an 
prominent position to Islam within its political and developmental programme partially in 
response to the growing sociological importance of religion identified in the previous section, 
but also because the bureaucratization of religion and religious practices increasingly offers a 
more practical and bureaucratically efficient way of stratifying the population than ethnicity 
does.  It is helpful to conceptualize this in terms of Scott’s notion of ‘legibility’.  James Scott has 
influentially argued that states engaged on large scale ‘development’ projects such as ‘scientific’ 
forestry in Prussia or villagization in Tanzania, are often driven by a desire to make their country 
‘legible’ – to map, classify and plan the environment as part of a ‘high modernist’ project (Scott 
1998).  In the cases Scott discusses, the state is not concerned with individuals per se – the 
citizen is, in his terminology, ‘abstract’ and, indeed, it is the abstraction of the citizen and the 
consequent absence of mētis or ‘local knowledge’ that undermines the success of such high 
modernist projects.  In Malaysia, however, the modernist, developmental project is inextricably 
tied to an a legitimizing discourse based explicitly on the plural fabric of society, termed 
elsewhere the ‘ethnic leviathan’ (Brown 2007): individuals are defined first and foremost by 
their group affiliation and political order is derived there from in a form of ‘authoritarian 
consociationalism’ which posits the suppression of liberal democratic rights and norms and a 
concomitant submissive dedication to a modernist project of ‘development’ as the necessary 
price to pay in a Hobbesian bargain to obvert ethnic conflict.  Increasingly, however, religion, 
rather than ethnicity, has proved more salient in this respect. 
It is the porosity of ethnic boundaries, I want to suggest, which has rendered it increasingly 
redundant as a source of deliberate social stratification.  This is particularly the case with respect 
to Malay identity – which the state has previously sought to privilege – both because it is of 
declining salience in urban areas and because the cultural basis of Malay identity itself is 
remarkably fluid.  Cultural ‘entry’ to ‘Malayness’ has historically and contemporarily been 
remarkably easy.  As already noted, from a bureaucratic perspective the census classification of 
‘Malay’ has broadened considerably over time.  With the nonnegotiable caveat of accepting 
Islam, acceptance into the Malay community – usually, though not always, through marriage – is 
largely uncontested.  Indeed, interethnic heritages are not uncommon among prominent and 
stridently ethnonationalist Malay politicians.  UMNO founder Onn Jaafar had a Turkish mother; 
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the mother of Tunku Abdul Rahman, the country’s first prime minister, was of Thai descent; 
Hussein Onn, third prime minister, was the son of Onn Jaafar and hence also had Turkish 
ancestry; Mahathir has Indian ancestry – a particularly remarkable fact given the virulence of his 
Malay chauvinism in his early career (Mahathir 1970).  More broadly, the fluidity of cultural 
entry to ‘Malaydom’ has left a linguistic trail in the virtual coterminous use of masuk Islam 
(enter/convert to Islam) and masuk Melayu (enter/become Malay).   
Returning to the survey, respondents were asked whether they would object to an interethnic or 
inter-religious marriage by their daughter or sister.  Interpreting the results of the inter-religious 
question for Malay respondents proved impossible precisely because of the conversion issue; 
many Malay respondents who expressed such an objection provided the explanation ‘mesti 
masuk Islam’ (must convert) and given that this is indeed a legal requirement – marriage to a 
Muslim is only legal if the non-Muslim partner, whether the man or the woman, first converts to 
Islam – it is unclear how many Malay respondents who did not express such an opposition did so 
precisely because they took such a caveat for granted.  These issues do not concern us when we 
consider objections to interethnic marriages, however.  Figure 3 shows the proportion of 
respondents objecting to interethnic marriage, broken down by ethnicity and urban-rural status.  
Unsurprisingly, urban objections to interethnic marriage are significantly lower than rural 
objections within each group.
8
   More importantly, however, in both urban and rural areas, 
Malay objections to interethnic marriage were likewise significantly lower than for the non-
Malay groups; in urban areas less than 15% of Malay respondents professed an objection to 
interethnic marriages. 
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Figure 3: Proportion of respondents objecting to inter-ethnic marriages by ethnicity and urban-rural status 
Notes: Error bars report 95% confidence interval 
                                                           
8
 Again, the significance of this result for the Indian population is unclear given the small number of rural 
Indians sampled and, hence, the large confidence interval. 
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If cultural entry to Malayness is relatively easy once the necessity of conversion is accepted, 
cultural exit is extremely difficult, again for religious reasons.  Apostasy, or rejecting Islam, is 
legally extremely difficult for Muslims in Malaysia, whether Malay or not.  Islamic affairs being 
under the jurisdiction of state administrations rather than the federal government, rules and 
practices on Muslim apostasy vary from state to state.  In some states, apostasy is explicitly 
outlawed, punishable with fines, imprisonment or whipping.  In other states, it is technically 
legal but requires the acceptance of a declaration of apostasy by a Shariah court, which also has 
the power to refuse to accept such a declaration and to send the appellant to a ‘rehabilitation 
centre’ to reconsider their faith. 
While apostasy has been accepted in limited circumstances, however, this has been 
overwhelmingly restricted to converts to Islam (saudara baru, lit. new brothers/sisters), usually 
for the sake of marriage, who have subsequently rejected Islam, usually after the breakdown of 
that marriage; acceptance of apostasy for Muslim-born Malaysians, whether Malay or 
otherwise, is virtually unheard of.
9
   Yet even at this low level, apostasy clearly presents a 
potential threat to (extreme communalist perceptions of) Malay identity, however, precisely 
because of the relative fluidity of Malay cultural entry.  Hence, for instance, in 1993 a Malay 
deputy minister in the federal government publicly expressed concern about the equation of 
masuk Islam with masuk Melayu, precisely because of the ‘large proportion’ (sebahagian besar) 
of these converts who subsequently rejected Islam.
10
   What is noticeable here is that the 
boundaries of ethnic Malay identity were seen as requiring extra shoring up against the relative 
porousness of Islam rather than vice versa. 
More important for the argument being made here, however, is the noticeable shift in the 
secular courts in Malaysia from accepting evidence of religious practice as evidence of religious 
identity to relying on a bureaucratic definition of a Muslim, referring issues of apostasy to the 
Shari’a Courts.  Two comparable cases in 1991 and 1992 highlight this transition.  Both cases 
related to recent widows petitioning the court to recognize that their deceased husbands were 
not Muslim at the time of their death, in order to be able to bury them according to non-Islamic 
rituals.  In the first case, a Chinese woman was successful in persuading the court that her 
husband had been a practising Buddhist at the time of his death, but a year later in similar 
circumstances, an Indian woman was unsuccessful in a similar petition because, while the court 
accepted evidence that her husband had eaten pork and prayed at a Sikh temple, he lacked a 
ruling from the Shari’a Court that he had indeed renounced Islam, and hence must be treated as 
a Muslim.  In a landmark 1999 ruling, the Federal Court – Malaysia’s highest court – 
subsequently ruled that it has no jurisdiction over matters of apostasy, which are now in the sole 
purview of the Shari’a Courts.  Islam remains constitutionally designated as a matter for state 
administrations rather than the federal government, but in 2003 the federal government 
undertook an initiative to introduce a standardized package of Islamic laws at the state level, 
                                                           
9
 The closest public case revolves around an elderly Malay woman who converted to Buddhism upon 
marriage in the 1930s.  Having lived as a practicing Buddhist all her life without significant problems, she 
petitioned for apostasy when her husband died in order that she would be able to be buried alongside 
him, but was refused.  After her own death, however, the Syariah court agreed that she had been a de 
facto apostate and hence allowed her to be buried in a non-Muslim cemetery. 
10
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which all but one state had passed by April 2005.
11
   This kind of bureaucratization of the Islamic 
legal system and informal practices, then, has increasingly rendered religion a more legible 
means of differentiating and stratifying society than the amorphous concept of ‘Malayness’.   
Indeed, looking beyond the West Malaysian peninsula to East Malaysia, the legibility advantages 
for the state of differentiating along religious rather than ethnic lines are even clearer.  As noted 
above, ethnic identity in East Malaysia is much less clearly bounded than in West Malaysia.  
Inter-marriage rates are high – more than 20% of the survey respondents in Sabah reported 
mixed parentage against only a handful of respondents in the West Malaysia sites – and a 
significant proportion of these are ‘Sinos’ – those of mixed Chinese and bumiputera descent 
(from a common contraction of Sino-Kadazan, Sino-Dusun, etc.).   Until recently, bumiputera 
status was transferred inter-generationally through either parent.  Hence, it is not entirely 
uncommon to find an East Malaysian bumiputera with an entirely Chinese sounding name and 
who practices Buddhism; indeed, a prominent Christian bumiputera family in Sabah which has 
produced a number of state and federal ministers carries the family name Ongkili, reportedly a 
concatenation of a paternal ancestor Ong Ki Li.
12
   In this context, state-sponsored Islamization 
with developmental inducements, and even ‘backdoor’ citizenship for Muslim migrants from 
neighbouring Indonesia and the Philippines, has a long track-record in East Malaysia (Lim 2008; 
Sadiq 2005). 
Social control as well as stratification is clearly implicated in this shift.  Prosecutions for khalwat 
(illicit proximity) have long been a feature of Malaysian society – although usually kept out of the 
courts through the rapid marriage of the offending parties – but this has been extended in 
recent years by a very public increase in moral policing associated with Islamic law.  In January 
2005, the Kuala Lumpur religious authorities, JAWI (Jabatan Agama Wilayah Persekutuan), 
raided a nightclub, detaining around a hundred Muslims and raising accusations of harassment 
of the female detainees.  While the government quickly responded in the wake of the public 
reaction, criticisms were largely leveled at the way in which the raid was conducted, rather than 
the principle that JAWI was entitled to conduct such raids.
13
   JAWI subsequently announced 
plans to set up ‘volunteer squads’ to watch for ‘indecent acts’ that contravene Islamic norms, 
including holding hands in public
14
; in 2003, a Chinese couple had been booked for holding 
hands in the KLCC Park in the city centre.  More recently, the Selangor state religious 
department JAIS (Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor) conducted a similar raid on a hotel nightclub, 
detaining around 100 Muslims and charging seven of them with consumption of alcohol.
15
   In 
commenting on this increase in moral policing with specific respect to the politics of ‘illegal 
migrants’, Hedman (2008: p.381) argues that the very public practice of such policing ‘reflects 
and reproduces the deeper anxieties (and ambitions) as to the requisites of constituting a 
properly reformed ‘Malay’ subject in Malaysia… [suggesting] a powerful dialectic at work in the 
(re)production of ‘Malay-ness’ through public spectacle and popular participation’.  I would 
argue, however, that short of being an attempt to reassert and reformulate Malay identity, 
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increasing social policing is, rather, a reflection of the decreasing salience of the ‘Malay/non-
Malay’ dichotomy and the increasing sociological importance and bureaucratic convenience of 
the ‘Muslim/non-Muslim’ dichotomy.   
This is not to suggest that ethnicity and ethnic identification will eventually give way to religion 
across the board – it seems highly unlike, for instance, that Malaysia’s affirmative action policies 
will ever be recast in explicitly religious rather than ethnic terms.  Moreover, Malaysia certainly 
still has its fair share of ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’  (cf. Brass 1997; Brass 2005; Lake & Rothchild 
1998) – from UMNO national leaders like Hishamuddin Hussain waving the kris, a Malay 
ceremonial dagger, at the party convention to aspiring local politicians like Penang based Ahmad 
Ismail describing the Chinese as ‘squatters’ in Malaysia.
16
  But such events are increasingly 
treated as something of an embarrassment by the BN coalition – Hishamuddin was forced to 
issue a public apology
17
, while Ahmad was suspended from his party for three years.
18
  Rather, in 
the state arena at least, ethnicity is increasingly being ‘operationalized’ through religious 
affiliation. Indeed, intra-Malay political competition – primarily between UMNO and PAS – has 
historically revolved around differing interpretations of Islam, although the emergence of the 
broadly pan-ethnic Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) in recent years may herald a change here (cf. 
Brown 2008).  But, Islam is increasingly taking up a more central role in Malay ethnic 
identification although, as the remarks of the British superintendent of the census quoted above 
demonstrated, this can be seen as something of a pendulum swing.   
5 Conclusions 
This article has examined the changing dynamics of group identification in Malaysia, paying 
particular attention to the politically dominant Malay community and the shift in emphasis from 
ethnicity as the basis of identification to religion.  I have argued that this should be understood 
as a dual process, resulting both from a ‘bottom-up’ Islamization movement drive largely by 
sociological pressures but also as a result of ‘top-down’ cultural and bureaucratic rationalization 
driven by state incentives for social ‘legibility’.  Within the context of a broadly hierarchical 
multi-cultural society, ‘Islam’ has become, for the state, a more legible means of differentiating 
and, to some extent, controlling the population than ‘Malay/bumiputera’.   
Ann Swidler (1986) influentially characterized culture as a ‘tool kit’ through which individuals 
understand and respond to the world around them.  Yet culture is not just a resource that 
individuals draw upon, it is also drawn upon and reshaped by the state and state practices.  
Many scholars have analysed the ways in which aspects of idealized Malay culture – notably a 
supposed unquestioning deference to leadership and social norms based on ‘politeness’ 
(kesopanan) and village practices – have been exploited by the state to claim political advantage 
(e.g. Chandra 1979; Walker 2004), but the political traction of these claims has become less 
viable in the modern, urban context – in one of his last major speeches as prime minister, 
Mahathir lambasted the Malays for ‘forgetting easily’ and failing to transfer their rural practices 
to the urban context.    
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To extend Swidler’s metaphor, thick identities provide more powerful tools; as religious identity 
has thickened in Malaysia, so state practices dichotomized along religious rather than ethnic 
lines have become a more potent source of social stratification and control for the state.  While 
the thickness of identity aspects may undergird the potency of cultural resources – the tools in 
the toolkit – however, culture is not infinitely malleable and the content of different cultures 
may gain more or less traction in different contexts.  Whereas Malay ethnic culture offers few 
resources for the state to draw upon in seeking to proscribe behaviour and norms in the 
modern, urban economy, particular interpretations of Islam – such as Abdullah’s Islam Hadhari – 
do offer such resources.   
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